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ABSTRACT
The argument of my thesis is that the God of Christian theology has adopted the doctrine 
of impassibility from Plato and Aristotle. According to this doctrine, God does not experience a 
variety of psychological states such as anger, sorrow, joy, and love. I will argue that the doctrine 
of impassibility is not only incongruent with the God of Scripture who is dynamic, redemptive, 
and loving toward his creation, but that it is antithetical to other core fundamental doctrines in 
Scripture.
I begin by giving an overview of the debate in Part I by surveying the three views on 
passibility and impassibility in the schools of Thomistic, Reformed, and Open Theism. In Part 
II, I give the negative case against God’s impassibility by looking at key texts in Scripture that 
are thought to give support to impassibility. In this section, I also criticize arguments commonly 
made for impassibility. First, I critically examine a notion of transcendence that is often used to 
defend impassibility and show how this notion would completely ignore scriptural evidence that 
God possesses different psychological states in his dialogue with humans. Second, in Part II, I 
respond to the argument that passibility puts God’s sovereignty at risk and argue that a God who 
desires good for his creation is not problematic. In Part III, I lay out the positive case for why I 
think God is passible. My defense rests upon the idea of God’s divine freedom, the doctrine of 
the imago Dei, and the concept that God is capable of redeeming his creation.
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1INTRODUCTION
There is a very old debate within Christian theology on the question of whether God is 
apathetic: is God impassible? As I will describe below, many thinkers have claimed that the 
God described in the Bible is not apathetic, while others have insisted that this view is deeply 
heretical and that God, for a variety of reasons, must be eternally impassible. Moreover, this 
debate has spanned over many theological subjects, each dealing with a different aspect of God. 
First, there have been debates about the impassibility of God’s nature: that is, over whether a 
substance that is perfect could have a metaphysical essence that admits of change. Second, there 
have been debates over whether God’s will is impassible: could God decree a thing to be so, 
but then later change his mind and will something different? Third, thinkers have had disputes 
over whether God feels our pain and experiences various emotional traits in response to events. 
Fourth, and finally, there is the familiar debate over whether God already knows the future of all 
contingent possibilities of moral agents; if he does, then God’s beliefs about what takes place in 
reality will never change even though this suggests that moral agents are not truly free; if he does 
not, then moral agents may be genuinely free, but then God’s beliefs about what transpires in 
reality will need to admit of change.
After giving a brief overview of the major thinkers who weighed in on the question of 
whether God is apathetic, I will articulate my own arguments for the claim that the doctrine 
of impassibility is fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of God as revealed in Scripture. 
First, I will argue that the biblical passages often used to support God’s impassibility are being 
misinterpreted and that the arguments commonly made in support of an apathetic God are 
2flawed. Second, I will present three arguments for the claim that God must be passible, given that 
God possesses divine freedom and love and that humans are made in the image of God.
3PART I: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE
I.1 The Thomistic and Reformed Tradition:
God Must Be Impassible
The doctrine of impassibility is defined as follows: “that nothing external can affect God – 
that nothing external can cause God to be in any state, and in particular can cause him to feel 
negative emotions like grief.”1 Impassibility is given a very robust treatment in the philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas in his magisterial work the Summa Theologiae. Perhaps it is not surprising that 
Aquinas defends an impassible God, given that this work is so heavily influenced by Aristotelian 
metaphysical ontology and that Aristotle conceived of God as the Unmoved Mover.2
To appreciate why Aquinas viewed God as impassible, one should first look at how he 
took humans to conceive of God. Aquinas had such a high view of God that he did not believe 
that we could truly understand the nature of God unless it was revealed to us by divine revelation 
in the sacred writings of Scripture.3 Aquinas believed that Scripture reveals to us some divine 
qualities about God, but that it could not fully reveal to us the essence and nature of the divine 
self. In order for God to communicate to us, since we are so ontologically different from God, 
he has to communicate in language that we can understand. According to Aquinas, language 
describes things in three fundamental ways: our language use can be univocal, equivocal, or 
analogical.4 With univocal language a word means basically the same thing when applied to 
1. Brian Leftow, “Immutability,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
revised August 5, 2014, accessed April 24, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immutability/.
2 Timothy McDermott, Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, Questions 2-13 and 20-211, ST. 1.9 and 
ST. 1.10 (New York: Eyre & Spottiwoode 1989), 336.
3. Ibid., 346.
4. Ibid.
4different beings. With equivocal language the meaning of a term changes dramatically when 
applied to two different beings. With analogical language, the meaning of a term changes 
proportionally when two different beings are described. Aquinas insists that our knowledge of 
God falls short of describing him exactly. God is infinite and we are finite. However, though 
we are different from God, Aquinas thinks we are not so different that our language about 
him is meaningless or merely equivocal. Our language is meaningful because it is analogical. 
Analogical language about God is possible because there is some sense in which man resembles 
God. Thus, when God speaks to us, he speaks in analogical language. Aquinas holds this view 
about analogical language because he thinks it helps us avoid the mistake of thinking of God 
as passible. Aquinas admits that biblical writers depict a God who changes, but he thinks 
these descriptions are merely human attempts to talk about a God who is, in fact, essentially 
unchanging: the words they are using do not perfectly and exactly describe God, but only refer 
to God analogically.
Aquinas further advances the position that, since God is beyond us ontologically, there 
can be no passions in God. He argues that passions are appetites, and appetites are bodily. 
However, because God is ontologically beyond anything human, God can have no body. Thus, 
he concludes, God cannot possess passions.5
Moreover, Aquinas argued, there are particular passions that are clearly unworthy and 
‘unbefitting to God.’ That is, even if we were to agree that God is subject to passions, we could 
still argue that certain passions would be contrary to his character. Which passions? “Sorrow or 
pain, for its subject is the already present evil, just as the object of joy is the good present and 
possessed. Sorrow and pain, therefore, of their very nature cannot be found in God.” Again, 
some passions that are distinguished by what Aquinas calls their “mode” are unbefitting to God. 
5. McDermott, 334-37.
5The mode is intrinsic to the passion, as we can appreciate by considering the distinction between 
joy and hope. Hope is not appropriate for God because it has as its object a good that is not yet 
possessed. “This cannot befit God, because of His perfection, which is so great that nothing can 
be added to it. Hope therefore, cannot be found in God. And likewise, neither can the desire of 
some [for] something not possessed.” A passion like fear cannot belong to God for both of these 
reasons. “By a twofold reason therefore, is fear excluded from God; both because it belongs only 
to one existing in potency and because it has for its object a threatening evil.”6
In this section, we have described Aquinas’s view that God is eternal, passionless, 
infinite, and unchanging. Such a God is ontologically different than we are. Aquinas admits 
that the biblical writers depict God as changing, but he interprets these as human attempts to 
talk about God. God is eternal and has no passions, for passions are associated with having a 
body; by contrast, human beings have passions and bodies. A God that is so different from us, 
resembling Aristotle’s non-communicating Unmoved Mover, can only communicate through 
analogical language. This, Aquinas thinks, is what we find in Scripture.
The conception of God as impassible is not a view we find only in medieval theology. 
In contemporary thought, this view is held by Reformed Theologians. Reformed theology has 
its roots in the Protestant Reformation with Martin Luther and John Calvin. They defended the 
doctrine of God as impassible and, on this issue, followed Thomas Aquinas. Reformed theology 
grounds its whole theological outlook on the classical view of God, as well as the theological 
doctrines like omniscience and omnipotence that flow out of this view. Some of the leading 
theologians among Reformed Theologians who have taken a very strong position for God’s 
6. Ibid. The citations of Aquinas concerning appetites are taken from Aristotle’s Physics and Nichomachean 
Ethics.
6sovereignty are R. C. Sproul, Bruce A. Ware, John Piper, and Norman Geisler. The Reformed 
Theologians’ view of impassibility is consistent with the Thomistic tradition.7
I.2 Open Theism and Evangelicals: God Is Passible
Open Theism is a view that calls into question the classical view of God held by both 
Thomism and Reformed Theology, arguing that this view does not pay sufficient attention to the 
way God is described in Scripture. Open Theism contends that “God, in grace, grants humans 
significant freedom to cooperate with or work against God’s will for their lives, and he enters 
into dynamic, give-and-take relationships with us. . . . We respond to God’s gracious initiatives 
and God responds to our responses. . . . God takes risks in this give-and-take relationship, yet he 
is endlessly resourceful and competent in working toward his ultimate goals.”8 This dynamic 
God is the one we find in Scripture, and so Open Theists like John Sanders argue that if we 
compare this God of Scripture to the God described by Reformed Theology, it becomes clear that 
the Reformed conception of God is being taken from Greek philosophy. This model, Sanders 
and others argue, is inconsistent with the biblical model of how God is seen in both Jewish and 
Christian Scriptures.
The debate between the Reformed tradition and Open Theism’s approach seems to come 
down to the idea of whether God is viewed in “relational terms.” For example, Clark Pinnock, 
another proponent of Open Theism, argues that “we need a philosophy which values change and 
can imagine God, not as distant from the world and immobile, but as intimately involved with 
7. See Bruce A. Ware, God’s Greater Glory: The Exalted God of Scripture and the Christian Faith 
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2004); God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2000); Their God Is Too Small: Open Theism and the Undermining of Confidence in God (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway, 2003); and John Piper, Justin Taylor, and Paul Kjoss Helseth, Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the 
Undermining of Biblical Christianity (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2003) for those who argue for God’s impassability.
8. Clark H. Pinnock et al., The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of 
God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 7.
7the world and dynamic.”9 He further argues that “the Bible itself assumes libertarian freedom 
when it posits personal give-and-take relationships and when it holds people responsible for 
their actions. Compatibilist or determinist freedom cannot easily account for such things. On this 
matter I am moved by the Bible itself.”10 Before Pinnock became an Open Theist, he had been 
committed to the Reformed tradition and its conception of God as being not only immutable, 
but definitely impassible. However, over time, Pinnock came to believe that this interpretation 
was the result of imposing Greek metaphysical attributes of God upon the biblical depiction 
of God in Scripture. Pinnock could no longer justify his position when he read certain texts in 
Scripture describing prayer and showing how God’s character responds to prayers; such a prayer-
responsive God, Pinnock concluded, could not be completely sovereign over human affairs and 
the author of every event.11
Pinnock further argues there is a need to “reform . . . the doctrine of God . . . on the basis 
of the scriptural foundations. Influences that have distorted our understanding must be confronted 
so that we can achieve greater theological soundness. . . . [F]rom early times, under the influence 
of alien ideals of perfection, theology has lost somewhat the biblical focus.”12 Like Sanders, 
Pinnock thinks that many of these distortions arise from reading too much Greek rationalism into 
sacred text. “A package of divine attributes has been constructed which leans in the direction 
of immobility and hyper-transcendence, particularly because of the influence of the Hellenistic 
category of unchangeableness.”13
9. Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openess (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2001), 90.
10. Ibid., 91.
11. See scriptural texts like 2 Kings 20 and Isaiah 38:5 when Hezekiah prayed that the Lord would extend 
his life, and James 5:13-18, where “the effective prayer of a righteous man can accomplish much” (v. 16).
12. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 41. 
13. Ibid.
8I.3 A Third Way? Lister’s Dialectical Tension
There are some philosophers who argue that the impassibility of God and the passibility 
of God are metaphysical concepts that can be held in tension with each other.14 For example, 
Lister believes that when we survey the history of the church from the Patristic period up until 
the modern period, we see that the doctrine of impassibility inspires debate between those 
who support it against those who deny it. Lister views this debate as unfortunate because he 
thinks that the Scripture, properly read, supports both the ideas of God’s transcendence and 
immanence – not in dualistic categories, but rather in juxtaposition to each other. He thinks we 
should see these positions in Scripture not in terms of either/or, but in dialectal tension with 
each other, informing us of God’s transcendence and immanence in the world. By claiming that 
God is both impassible and passible, Lister emphasizes both polarities in the essence of God. 
The problem is not with these polarities, but with our cognition of God. Because of our limited 
conceptualization, we can see these two positions as an antinomy in God or in Scripture.
14. Robert Lister, God Is Impassible and Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion (Wheaton, 
IL: Crossway, 2013), 29-37, gives an excellent survey of the debate throughout the history of the church.
9PART II: THE NEGATIVE CASE AGAINST
GOD’S IMPASSIBILITY
So, who is correct in the debate about God’s impassibility? Is the Thomistic/Reformed 
view the best? Or is it true that God is passible? Or should we embrace some third way, like 
Lister? I believe, like many Evangelicals and Open Theists, that God is passible and that the 
impassible view of God is false. In this second part of my thesis, I will argue against those who 
have defended God’s impassibility, and in Part III of my thesis, I will offer arguments in favor of 
God’s passibility.
II.1 Misunderstanding Passages in Scripture
Many theologians who defend the impassibility of God turn to Scripture for support, but I 
believe that the texts cited in defense of impassibility destroy their true meaning. In this section, 
I will look at four of the main texts offered in support of impassibility. These are passages in 
Scripture that are taught to demonstrate that God is impassible, but under closer examination we 
will find the very opposite of God’s impassibility.15
Malachi 3:6: “For I, the Lord, do not change; therefore you, O sons of Jacob, are not 
consumed.” Does Malachi teach immutability in God’s nature and affections? This text, taken 
within the context of the whole chapter, teaches that God is unchangeable in his promise to 
Abraham and Isaac. Here, God announces to heirs that he would still make good on the oath 
that he made to Abraham nearly seven hundred years earlier (Gen. 12). God will not change his 
15. There are other texts that Reformed Theologians use to justify the impassibility of God. See Isaiah 46:9-
10 and 48:3-5. All scriptural citations are taken from the New American Standard Bible (La Habra, CA: Lockman 
Foundation, 1995).
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counsel (purpose) to make Abraham a great nation and also make all the nations of the earth 
blessed through him. So, this text does not teach that God has an impassible nature, but only that 
when God makes covenants and promises, he keeps them.
Hebrews 6:13-18:
 For when God made the promise to Abraham, since He could swear by no one 
greater, He swore by Himself, saying, “I wILL sureLy bLess you and I wILL sureLy 
muLtIpLy you.” And so, having patiently waited, he obtained the promise. For men swear 
by one greater than themselves, and with them an oath given as confirmation is an end 
of every dispute. In the same way God, desiring even more to show to the heirs of the 
promise the unchangeableness of His purpose, interposed with an oath, so that by two 
unchangeable things in which it is impossible for God to lie, we who have taken refuge 
would have strong encouragement to take hold of the hope set before us.
Does Hebrew 6:13-18 teach God’s immutability in his nature and affections? Or does this text 
teach merely that God is immutable in his purpose to bring to fruition the promise he made to 
Abraham in Genesis 12 to make a great nation from his loins through Isaac? It seems to me that 
God is here portrayed as unchangeable in his purpose. Here, he is unchanging in his call to the 
Gentiles to be saved by Jesus Christ, he is unchanging in his call for every penitent believer to 
have faith, and he is unchanging in his plea that believers accept faith in Christ as the grounds 
of justification in place of their own personal righteousness. This verse does not teach the 
immutability of God’s nature nor does it show he lacks freedom to respond to free moral agents. 
Rather, it shows only that God is sticking by his commitment to fulfill his earlier promise.
James 1:17: “Every good thing given and every perfect gift is from above, coming down 
from the Father of lights, with whom there is no variation or shifting shadow.” Does this James 
1:17 passage teach the immutability of God’s nature? I do not believe so. Rather, this text only 
teaches that God possesses moral perfection. James teaches that whatever is good is from God, 
and whatever is evil comes from man himself. Just as the Sun shines and radiates, so it is with 
God whose moral nature shines in its perfection so that no cloud of sin or darkness can cover or 
11
hide his moral perfection. This passage (much like 1 John 1:5) says that God’s moral character 
is perfect, and that his gifts will always come to us, but it says nothing about the impassibility of 
God.
In summary, none of these scriptural texts that are commonly used to justify the claim 
that God is impassible truly provide that support. These texts show that God makes promises, 
embraces purposes, and offers gifts that humans can count on and that God will reliably uphold. 
But these texts do not show that God has an unchangeable nature or will, that God knows all 
future contingents, or that God is without emotion.
II.2 A Misconceived Transcendence
Let me now turn to analyzing the arguments that are often made in support of 
impassibility. In the Thomistic and Reformed traditions, there is great emphasis upon the 
doctrine of the transcendence of God and his sovereignty. Transcendence is the idea that God 
is ontologically beyond who we are and we cannot comprehend who he is. In this way, the 
Reformed view of God somewhat resembles the God of Aristotle who is eternal, unchanging, 
impassible, and has no bodily matter.
Aquinas and those in the Reformed tradition wish to emphasize transcendence because 
they believe acknowledging God’s immanence in the world would force us to draw false 
conclusions. They argue like this:
(1) If God is not fully transcendent, then God is not in complete control.
(2) If God is not in complete control, then God cannot right wrong and give us hope.
(3) God does right wrong and gives us hope.
Thus, God is fully transcendent.
In other words, it seems to many theologians in the Reformed tradition that a God who is not 
fully transcendent will also not be omnipotent or omnibenevolent.
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I believe that this line of reasoning is problematic. In particular, I reject the second 
premise of this argument. Even if God is not in complete control of the universe, it does not 
follow that God cannot be a redeemer and give us hope. The God of Christian theology seeks 
to enter true partnership rather than dictate unilaterally how things will go, thereby giving his 
creatures some measure of freewill. It follows that divine sovereignty does not negate divine 
freedom, but our notion of divine sovereignty needs to be redefined in light of the fluidity of God 
who is open to the future, as I believe the evidence of Scripture warrants.
II.3 Ignoring God’s Feelings and His
Dialogue with Humans
Theologians in both the Thomistic and Reformed traditions interpret descriptions of 
God having psychological states as merely misleading anthropomorphic or figurative language. 
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human characteristics such as emotions to God.
I disagree with these Thomistic and Reformed theologians, and I do not think there is 
anything misleading about portraying God as having various psychological states or feelings, 
desires, and the experiences of sorrow and compassion for those who repent. On the contrary, 
it would make perfect sense that the divine emotions of God are expressed through jealousy, 
provoked anger, joy, regret, love, and divine repentance.
First, consider the text of the Bible itself. In Scripture, we are not presented with a static 
view of God, but instead a view of one who is dynamic and who enters into divine-human 
dialogue with free moral agents to achieve the desired purpose/goals for humanity. God is often 
portrayed in Scripture as being frustrated with his people Israel. Often, he is shocked by their 
actions and never thought that they would have made some of their choices. This can clearly be 
seen when God instructs the prophet Hosea to go and get his wife who has played the harlot. In 
Ezekiel 16, God is depicted as a jealous lover torn between whether he should divorce his true 
13
love or plead for her to repent and come back to him. God is depicted as a jealous God, when 
Israel plays the harlot in Ezekiel 16 and in Hosea.
Given that the Bible portrays God as having different psychological states, it is also 
appropriate that the Bible shows God using covenant or conditional language. After all, this sort 
of language assumes that God changes his beliefs based on how humans do or do not act. For 
example, God says to Abraham or Israel that if they are willing to do x, then he will be willing to 
do y. This indicates that God is willing to cooperate and work alongside human agents to create a 
better future, or even the best of possible worlds, for those who will trust him.
This kind of conditional language can be found throughout Scripture, and there is no 
reason to explain it all away simply by appealing to anthropomorphism – saying that God is 
merely using human language to accommodate his unchanging will and purpose. Explaining 
Scripture away like this ignores the fact that God is here depicted as acting in ways that are 
adequately described by human-centered language. For example, God in Scripture is depicted 
as being a jilted lover in his relationship with Israel in Hosea and Ezekiel. A lover’s quarrel or 
marital language suggests a contractual relationship between two parties. Again, consider that 
in Exodus and Deuteronomy God makes a covenant with Israel and she refuses to live up to her 
covenant and part of the contract. Finally, remember that Jesus, which God manifested in flesh, 
is the God-Man who inaugurates and ratifies a “New Covenant” not with Israel only, but to all 
those who are willing to trust God.
If God were truly emotionless, without changes in psychology, and beyond all dialogue 
with humans, the Scriptures would not depict God as surprised or disappointed, and Scripture 
would not show God forming covenants and contracts with humans since such activity requires 
God to dialogue with humans and change his beliefs based on what they will and will not do.
14
II.4 A False Threat to God’s Sovereignty
The reason that many Reformed theologians hold to the doctrine of immutability is that 
they believe that a passible God is a God that is not sovereign. They reason this way:
(1) If God is subject to the reactions of human agents, then God cannot be in complete 
control of the universe.
(2) God is all-powerful and in complete control of the universe.
Therefore, God cannot be subject to the reactions of human agents.
I believe this argument is flawed because the second premise is false. It is true that Scripture 
depicts God as maximally powerful, but this does not mean that God alone has power. Other 
creatures exercise power as well, although not to the same degree that God does. Moreover, the 
conclusion of this argument ignores the very clear teaching of Scripture: God gives human agents 
power (freewill) to accept or reject God’s will and purpose for their lives (see Luke 7:30).
Here is another version of the argument made by those in the Reformed tradition:
(1) God is all-knowing.
(2) If God can be taken by surprise, then God is not all-knowing.
Therefore, God cannot be taken by surprise.
This argument is flawed because the first premise is false. As we have seen, God has maximal 
power, not complete power. The fact that God has maximal power does not eliminate the 
possibility for him to react to the creatures he has created. But since God, in creating the best of 
all worlds, created creatures with free will, it would be incorrect to prohibit God from having the 
sort of responses that are appropriate to acts of free will. Such an appropriate response of God to 
his creatures in no way compromises the extent of divine power.
15
II.5 A Desiring God Is Not Problematic
The New Testament teaches that God is love (1 John 3:16). Moreover, the New Testament 
teaches that God expresses his love not only in creation, but also in his divine providence for 
the redemption of fallen creatures. In fact, God so loves the creatures that he chooses to become 
sin-bearer in human flesh (sarx) to be the redeemer and to redeem fallen humanity. Thomistic 
and Reformed theologians think it would be heretical to claim, on the basis of these scriptural 
passages, that God’s love is in any way based in desire. They make the following argument:
(1) If God does have desires, then God needs or lacks something.
(2) If God needs or lacks something, then God is not perfect.
(3) God is perfect.
Thus, God cannot have desire.
I believe the first premise is false. I agree with Robert Adams, who refutes this view by 
advancing the position that God can desire and love his creatures without being deficient. He 
argues that when God desires, he does so by desiring the best for his creatures, and desiring 
that they choose what is best.16 This is why the New Testament depicts God as “longsuffering” 
toward human beings, not wishing (desiring) that any should perish (2 Pet. 3: 9; 14).
Some theologians might also worry that by making God passible and attributing desires 
to God, we are claiming that God acts selfishly. After all, on this view, when God exercises his 
will, he does so to fulfill his own desires. But Adams successfully objects to this argument by 
drawing a contrast between self-interest, selfishness, and self-regarding. Self-regarding has to do 
with God’s own interest in his creation by seeing that his project reflects his own glory (1 Cor. 
10:31). Selfishness would depict an emotional aspect of God that would be a negation of God’s 
16. Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 134-35. 
Adams’ chapters on “Loving the Good: Eros” and chapter 6 on “Grace” depict the notion of God loving finite goods.
16
moral perfection. But what we see depicted in Scripture is a God who is concerned about his 
creation and the human beings he has made. God has a self-interested investment in his creation 
in the sense that he is interested to see it reach the maximal capacity for which he created it. God 
is a fellowship of persons, a relational being, and open to the joy and pain of the world. God 
creates in order to create love and relationships – he delights to hear in the love of finite persons 
an echo of the love that constitutes his own reality. God’s desire for this kind of delight is not an 
exercise in selfishness.
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PART III: THE POSITIVE CASE THAT
GOD IS PASSIBLE
III.1 God’s Divine Freedom
In Scripture, God is consistently depicted as being free to choose. God is free to create 
and he is free to be involved with his creatures that reflect his image and participate with 
him in ruling his creation (Gen. 1:26-28). God is not a static state as claimed in the doctrine 
of impassibility, which deprives God of his divine freedom. In Scripture, God is depicted 
as being free to do what he determines to be the best without being confined by any divine 
necessity flowing from his nature. Rather, God acts from his divine will. God is free to relate 
to his creatures as he thinks best. But in the classical view of God, which resembles Aristotle’s 
Unmoved Mover, he is eternally unchanging, not exercising his will freely, and not experiencing 
any emotions.
Karl Barth, reacting to a nineteenth century and Enlightenment project that emphasized 
human reason and the doctrine of immanence, argued that it was God’s divine freedom and grace 
that allowed God to be revealed in history and known by the miracle of Jesus Christ.17 What 
does it mean that God is free? Barth believed that the freedom of God is not to be captured by 
human reason and that there could be no divine constraint on God’s divine power to act and 
choose as he wills.
Conceiving of God as radically free does not imply or lead to a tension between God’s 
divine will and his divine reason. God in Scripture is adaptable to human decisions and not 
17. See Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th-Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional 
Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 70.
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immobile. He does not have to sit by helpless or unconcerned. God’s love is expressed well 
by Barth who “divided the divine perfections into two categories, the perfections of the divine 
loving and the perfections of the divine freedom. This rubric replaced the traditional duality of 
God’s immanence and transcendence.”18
The best way of appreciating how God’s radical freedom is perfectly consistent with the 
idea of divine perfection and divine love can be seen in the doctrine of the Trinity. In Scripture, 
God is said to be in relationship with the other members of the godhead known as the Trinity. 
The Trinity demonstrates that God is free within himself in relationship between the participants 
within the divine community. For example, one way of conceiving of the Trinity is as the 
Essential Trinity or also called the Immanent or Ontological Trinity. This view focuses upon the 
essence or substance of God; what God is actually like in himself as he stands outside the created 
universe. It is how God appears to God.
The so-called “Economic view” of the Trinity is concerned with how we experience God 
in our lives, in creation, and through salvation. This is how God appears to us. Some theologians 
point out that only the Son and the Spirit are directly met in the Economic Trinity. The Economic 
and Essential Trinity are not two separate entities – just two ways of looking at God. When God 
reveals himself to us, is it merely the “face” God wears as he turns to us, or is it how God is in 
himself? Is his face something he merely displays, or does his face unambiguously disclose his 
heart? The Western Church believes that they are pretty much the same and that we meet God 
fully and completely as he is through his actions. The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ 
Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity. To put it another way: God’s actions 
reveal who God is. And since God acts as a threefold God, God himself must be threefold.
18. Grenz and Olson, 73.
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Finally, in concert with the redemptive and atoning work of the Son, the Holy Spirit 
functions to bring about a renewal of creation and applies redemption in the lives of the fallen 
who are made in the image of God. This renewal and application is done by the proclamation 
of the church in her task of ministry of announcing to the world that times of refreshing and 
restoration have begun.
When one considers Barth’s view of divine freedom and understand how the Trinity 
exemplifies freedom, one can see how God’s divine freedom requires God to be passible. This 
simply means that God is free to respond and reveal himself to his creatures in Jesus Christ. 
God’s revelation is God’s gift to be received in faith; it is not human beings who define how 
God chooses to act, but God as Trinity chooses to reveal himself in redemption on behalf of 
fallen humanity. Barth believes that whenever we restrict God in his movement in the Trinity 
for redemption, we reduce him to our taxonomy and have domesticated God. Barth believes that 
God’s self-revelation, which is an event, cannot and must not be reducible to human categories of 
reason, and this he finds as problematic and dangerous with natural theology. It is not that Barth 
rejects reason as an attempt to understand God’s revelation, but the only epistemic ground for 
knowledge of God and about God is revelation and not reason. This epistemic grounding Barth 
believes allows God to be free in the self-communication of himself in the revelation of Jesus 
Christ as a human person and human history.
III.2 The Image of God
The Scriptures teach that man is made in the image of God. This view of human beings 
is found in Genesis 1:26-28, where the divine triad speaks, “Let Us make man in Our image, 
according to Our likeness.” This suggests that man is uniquely made and crafted to be an 
image bearer and a reflection of the God in the created order. Man in his original state was 
created with glory and honor and told to rule as a vice-regent over God’s creation. Man’s idea 
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and vision of how creation was to be cared for was to reflect his ongoing relationship with 
his Creator. This means that man must be understood from God’s vantage point rather from a 
simply humanistic or scientific point of view. God’s being must have some relations to us as 
human beings.
Theologians have debated down through the centuries as to the exact meaning of the 
phrase “in the image of God” – the imago Dei. This is a difficult idea because the God of 
Scripture appears to be a divine society. So, when we think of man made in the image of God, 
we cannot take this to mean merely that human reason is a reflection of the divine image, but 
that humans also reflect something complex, and reflect other aspects of God’s being. After 
all, God is not depicted in Scripture as a God who reasons only, but is also depicted as having 
psychological states of getting angry, relenting, repenting, and feeling ambivalence about the 
actions of human beings.
However, although human beings reflect God, it is not the case that everything about 
humanity is a reflection of God. In Scripture, human beings are not only depicted as image 
bearers, but they are also depicted as fallen creatures and sinners. Sin is rooted into the very heart 
of human beings in the misuse of their free will, as Augustine argues. Human sin, according 
to Augustine, is rooted in the pride of human subjects who through their capacity for “self-
transcendence . . . refuse to acknowledge [their] own creatureliness.”19 The Protestant Reformers 
had a correct view of human sinfulness “as an act of the whole person, so that no realm of human 
reality can be exonerated from complicity in our rebellion against God.”20
Humans do not resemble God in their sinfulness. Nevertheless, despite their fall, they still 
possess reason – and reason is never so damaged that it cannot recognize rays of divinity shining 
19. Grenz and Olson, 104.
20. Ibid.
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through the created order and grasp that there must be some divine reality behind the world of 
appearances. John Calvin said it well when he said,
For what man in all the world would not gladly remain as he is – what man does not 
remain as he is – so long as he does not know himself, that is, while content with his own 
gifts, and either ignorant or unmindful of his own misery? Accordingly, the knowledge 
of ourselves not only arouses us to seek God, but also, as it were, leads us by the hand to 
find him.21
Thomistic and Reformed theologians claim that the “image of God” refers only to human 
rationality, and thus they think that God resembles man only by being rational. The doctrine of 
the “image of God” teaches us by theological import that there is a point of contact between God 
and us. There is no reason we should limit our resemblance to God and claim that we resemble 
him only in our rationality.
III.3 A Redeeming God Must Be Passible
First, consider that God enters human history. Since the days of the early church in the 
second century, scholars have argued with one another in trying to understand Paul’s teaching 
concerning the kenotic doctrine in Philippians 2:1-10. What did Jesus “empty himself” of 
when he took the “form of a servant”? What was it then that God gave up in what theologians 
refer to as “the Kenosis theory” found in John 1:1-18, 3:16; Matthew 1:23-25; Galatians 
4:1-4; and Philippians 2:5-10? This is a difficult issue because it is hard to understand how 
God could become flesh, and hard to see how God could actually suffer at the hands of mere 
mortals. However one resolves these disputes, however, it is absolutely clear that by “emptying 
himself” Jesus had to undergo some important change. This, it seems, requires us to think of 
God as changeable and passible. Indeed, as Soren Kierkegaard famously pointed out, this is an 
incredibly radical change. The incarnation “involves a double paradox. It asserts that God has 
21. John Calvin, John Calvin: Selections from His Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (Missoula, MT: Scholars 
Press, 1975), 320-21.
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become human, that the Eternal has become temporal. And it declares that our eternal happiness 
has its foundation in a historical event.”22
Second, remember that God sent his Son to die and suffer at the hands of wicked man 
(see Isa. 53 and the crucifixion narratives in Matt. 26-27) in order to redeem the original sin of 
mankind. As described by Christian theology, humanity needed such reconciliation because of 
Original Sin. This doctrine not only has precedent in Scripture in the first man’s disobedience, 
but it is also grounded in the reality of all the leading church fathers from Augustine down to 
the Thomistic and Reformed tradition. It is the notion that human beings have a fundamental 
problem: they are in a state of rebellion and they are fugitives from a just God. As Reinhold 
Niebuhr put it, the notion of original sin is the idea that humans misuse free will and the capacity 
of self-transcendence.23 This radical disorientation of the self and the disordered affections are 
rooted in the noetic effects of the fall.
If God sent his Son to die on the cross as a response to the fallen condition of human 
beings, it seems that we must understand God as passible. After all, such a redeeming God is 
responding to the condition of humans and responding to their wickedness. It seems to me that 
the refusal by philosophers and theologians of the Thomistic and Reformed traditions to take 
seriously the idea of a passible God would require them to also downplay the importance of 
God as a redeemer. For if God is impassible, God cannot respond to sin as a redeemer. God 
would be immobile and could not express any feelings of concern about the creature and the 
falleness of creation because, being immobile and impassible, he would be unable to perform or 
do anything.
22. Grenz and Olson, 65.
23. Ibid., 263.
23
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the doctrine of impassibility is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
God of Christian theology. I have also argued that the biblical passages often used to support 
God’s impassibility are being misinterpreted, and I have shown that the arguments commonly 
made in support of an apathetic God are flawed. I have presented three arguments that prove the 
God of Christian theology is passible, given that God possesses divine freedom and love and that 
humans are made in the image of God.
If my thesis is correct, a great deal of modern philosophical discourse in the reformed 
tradition is wrong because it depicts God in a way that is too much like the god described in 
ancient Greek philosophy. William Rowe, in his classical text Can God Be Free? captures this 
idea well when he points out that God’s moral perfection and divine freedom are based on 
Aristotle’s metaphysics of a perfect being without change:
For given that he is omnipotent and the creator of all things other than himself, it is 
evident that nothing outside of him determines him to create whatever he does create. . . . 
So, the fact that nothing outside of God determines him to create or act as he does 
clearly shows that God is an autonomous agent; he is self-determining in the sense that 
his actions are the result of decisions that are determined only by his own nature. . . . 
For in God there is no possibility of his passions overcoming the judgment of reason. . . . 
Since God is a purely rational being and not subject to uncontrollable passions that 
sometimes compel human beings to act, it is tempting to conclude that God enjoys 
perfect freedom of action.24
Like Rowe, I believe it is a mistake to ascribe impassibility to God. In this thesis, I have argued 
that it is a mistake to conceive of the Christian God as a transcendent being who does not change, 
24. William L. Rowe, Can God Be Free? (New York: Oxford Press, 2004), 15.
24
who does not feel, who does not covenant, and who does not seek to enter into dialogue with 
human beings.
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